

clean

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED~~

Copy 28 of 20 copies  
each of 12 sheets

WSEG  
FILE COPY

Mr. Ponturo  
27 February 1963

RETIREMENT COPY  
1967

INVENTORY OCT 21 1968

LOANED

INVENTORY APR 9 1963

FIRST DRAFT

INVENTORY FEB 13 1975

C-I NO. 3 WORKING PAPER NO. 1

CHRONOLOGY OF CERTAIN ACTIONS BY U.S. ACTORS IN THE  
SOUTH VIETNAM SITUATION, APRIL 1960 - JANUARY 1962

THIS DOCUMENT AS A WHOLE IS CLASSIFIED ~~TOP SECRET~~  
INDIVIDUAL PORTIONS AND ATTACHMENTS HERETO  
CARRY THEIR APPROPRIATE CLASSIFICATION.

INVENTORY JAN 24 1972

"NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION"  
"Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to  
Criminal Sanctions"

INVENTORY MAR 8 1973

EXCLUDED FROM THE GDS

~~GROUP - 1~~

~~EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION~~

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

Reproduction of this document in whole or in part is prohibited except  
with permission of the issuing office. It will not be removed from the  
WSEG area in the Pentagon without approval of the Executive Secretary

Please sign opposite your name and fill in the required information

Routing	Signature	Date		Remarks (Indicate portions read)
		Received	Released	

Return this document to TS/LD Section, Room 1E880, PERSONALLY, or call  
77313 for pickup. Do not release to Messengers, Area Control Clerks or  
anyone else. Make sure you obtain your receipt upon return of this document.

STCS/DOC DIV  
CY R-3  
FOI 637A

QASD(PA) DFOISR 83-TS-78

~~TOP SECRET~~

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

095301

80 F O I 997 Doc 7

Log No. TS-63-105/1



#506

C-I NO. 3 WORKING PAPER NO. 1

PREFACE

This paper is a first-cut attempt to structure a consecutive pattern of decisions and actions in the South Vietnam situation. The purpose of issuing it is to see where we are and where we are going.

The following points are in order:

The chronology is incomplete, with many omissions and many loose ends hanging. I have only been through a small percent of the major documents. I have spotted hardly any Presidential actions, for example, and none of the Task Force deliberations.

The chief U.S. actors are shown as President, State, Defense, CINCPAC, and Country Team. It will ultimately be preferable to break up at least Defense and Country Team into several actors for each, to add other actors like Government of South Vietnam and the Communist Bloc countries, and to provide these actors with "scenery" in the sense of situational context.

The actions shown are a rather miscellaneous set, because I do not yet have sufficiently matured clues as to what is going to be important in the story.

Cross-referencing of the actions (numbers in parentheses) is an initial attempt to tie together some of the obvious subplots of the story.

Some of the peculiar abbreviations used are:

ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
CC	Communist China
CG	Civil Guard
CI	Counter-Insurgency
CIP	Counter-Insurgency Plan
CT	Country Team

~~TOP SECRET~~

GVN Government of South Vietnam  
JGS Joint General Staff of South Vietnam  
MR Military Region  
MRC Military Region Commander  
NVN North Vietnam  
PC Province Chief  
RVNAF Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces  
SDC Self-Defense Corps  
SEA Southeast Asia  
SVN South Vietnam  
VC Viet Cong  
VNAF South Vietnam Air Force

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

<u>DATE</u>	<u>PRESIDENT</u>	<u>STATE</u>	<u>DEFENSE</u>	<u>CINCPAC</u>	<u>COUNTRY TEAM</u>
27 Apr 60				1. Sends JCS a "study" on Counterinsurgency Operations in SVN and Laos, analyzing situation in SVN (and Laos) as critical, requiring GVN to establish emergency operations command/control system to integrate civil/military/political efforts in accord with a real campaign plan. Asks for all U.S. agencies in Washington and in the field to cooperate fully in supporting such a campaign with increased and coordinated advice and aid to GVN. CINCPAC states he intends to use the study as the basis for his actions, but warns they will be fruitless without the support of implementing actions by Washington agencies.	2. Study (1) was put in final form during the PACOM conference of MAAG chiefs the previous week with the collaboration of Chief MAAG Vietnam and Chief PEO Laos, both of whom endorsed it.
5 May 60			3. Announces that MAAG Vietnam will be increased from 327 to 685 members, at request of SVN.		
3 June 60			4. JCS notes the CINCPAC CI Study (1), agrees that prompt and full support of all departments and agencies involved in SEA is essential to effective action by CINCPAC, decides to recommend that the SecDef initiate action to insure that those departments and agencies (a) encourage SVN (and Laos) to adopt a national emergency command organization to integrate civil and military resources and national policies, (b) be authorized and directed to support the CI campaigns, and (c) provide sufficient budgetary and material support to insure success. Copy JCS decision goes to CINCPAC.		
11 June 60			5. Herter writes Gates, mentions possibility of new aggressive moves by CG, including stepped up guerrilla war in SEA. Requests views on whether further measures beyond those programmed would be needed to encounter increased guerrilla war in SVN (and Laos).		
30 June 60				6. Sends JCS a draft outline plan for CI by GVN, asks the JCS to approve and pass to the SecDef for joint State-DOD-ICA action to expand the plan in detail and prepare estimates of U.S. support requirements, before attempting to get the plan accepted by GVN. CINCPAC encloses a draft JCS memo to the SecDef and a draft State-DOD-ICA message to the Ambassador and the CI directing them to develop the outline plan in further detail for Washington review. The outline CIP spells out a command/control organization including a National Emergency Council and a Director of Operations to formulate a national CI plan and assure integration of effort; political economic and psychological measures to win over the people; and beefed-up military, paramilitary and police efforts under centralized direction.	
25 July (?)			7. Douglas (?) replies to Herter (5). Says that SVN is capable of coping with insurgency at the present tempo but that emergency requirements might arise at any time. Recommends a State-Defense working group to coordinate U.S. efforts to (a) obtain needed flexibility to respond rapidly to Red moves, (b) get SVN to adopt a national emergency organization to integrate resources for CI operations and to develop a national CI plan, and (c) provide U.S. material and budgetary support for the GVN CI campaign.		
26 Aug 60			8. JCS agrees to send CINCPAC memo to the SecDef enclosing his outline CIP and his draft interagency directive (6), and to ask the SecDef to initiate appropriate action.		
16 Sept 60			9. Acting SecDef memo to Sec State forwards the JCS memo (8); says he agrees in principle with the JCS views and is making the JCS recommendations and CINCPAC's outline CIP available to enable State-Defense staffs to work together in developing implementing instructions. Cites a recent SNEE on the increasing urgency of the SVN situation.		
(?) 60			10. Passes JCS recommendations (9) to CT as guidance in developing a CIP, directs CT to submit for review by Washington agencies for consistency with U.S. policy and for funding.		
13 Nov 60			11. Expresses satisfaction at failure of coup against Diem (11 Nov), and expresses hope that his powers will be established on a wider basis with implementation of "radical" reform.		

2-26-63-10

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

<u>DATE</u>	<u>PRESIDENT</u>	<u>STATE</u>	<u>DEFENSE</u>	<u>CINCPAC</u>	<u>COUNTRY TEAM</u>
4 Jan 61					12. Sends completed CIP to State (10). CIP covers political, economic, military actions, by GVN, CT, and U.S. agencies. Provides for increase of RVNAP strength from 150,000 to 170,000, MAP support of 32,000 Civil Guard (CG). Calls for some broadening and liberalization of Diem regime, and is predicated upon extraordinary US/GVN cooperation.
18 Jan 61					13. Requests 20,000-man increase in RVNAP, after CHMAAG overcomes Ambassador's objections.
28 Jan 61					14. CHMAAG requests authority to permit assignment of U.S. advisers at lower echelons (than battalion) in the RVNAP.
31 Jan 61	15. Authorizes increase of \$28.4 million to expand RVNAP by 20,000 men to 170,000, and \$12.9 million to improve quality of CG.		16. JCS refers CT CIP (12) to J-3 for comment and recommendations, asks for report by 1 February.	17. Authorizes CHMAAG to detail MAAG advisors down to battalion hq. in the RVNAP and to the CP's of smaller units when required. Not to include authorization to place advisers forward of battalion or separate smaller units in disputed areas. CHMAAG to take every precaution to avoid assignments exposing U.S. personnel to risk of capture, to embarrassment of USG. (14)	
1 Feb 61		18. Proposes State-Defense message to Saigon approving CIP (12) based on funding authorization (13). Suggest Ambassador and Chief MAAG present CIP to Diem. If CT believes GVN will not cooperate should inform SecState and make recommendations, perhaps including suspension of U.S. contribution.	19. JCS approves 20,000-man increase in RVNAP; ISA to determine source of funds to support increase. (15)		
3 Feb 61		20. Parsons writes Ambassador that State has approved CIP despite reservations on the balance of infantry regiments versus ranger companies in the 20,000-man buildup (18). Question relates to emphasis on CI as against the external threat.	21. DJS memo for JCS on review of CIP. Asks for expeditious JCS approval in view of recent Presidential and State actions. (15 and 18). Says time does not permit review and comments by CINCPAC and the Services, but that the CINCPAC GCI indicates informally that CINCPAC approval is expected.		
6 Feb 61			22. JCS approves CIP "in principle," subject to possible revisions in support requirements that review by the Services may indicate are necessary or desirable. (21)		23. Ambassador and CHMAAG formally present CIP to Diem. (18)
13 Feb 61					
24 Feb 61		24. Rusk message to Assem Saigon and CINCPAC Polad states that Pres. ranks defense of SVN among highest priorities U.S. foreign policy; having approved CIP, concerned whether SVN can resist over 18-24 month period before CIP takes full effect; has asked State to study prompt steps to further strengthen SVN. Unless Amb. or CINCPAC object authorized to take following actions without awaiting GVN approval of CIP: a. On priority basis send MAAG best qualified personnel for CI training, cut short tours of less qualified there now. b. Incorporate group of U.K. and/or Malay officers into ARVN or CG program. c. Devise and implement program for training 65 present Ranger companies in 18 months. d. Higher priority activating additional 21 Ranger cys. e. Change CIP to add 40 more Ranger cys. and reduce proposed infantry regiments proportionately. f. [ ] g. Increase priority on border patrol, village transceivers, civil action. h. With or without GVN participation, prepare overall operations plan, geographically phased, for consolidation of safe areas and consolidation program for newly won areas. i. Step up land distribution and increase peasant income. j. Study treatment of VC prisoners to encourage defections. Consider methods used in F.I. and Burma.			25. Reports to JCS on current military support of CI operations in SVN, states that Ambassador has presented CIP to Diem and that Diem has (a) transferred the CG to the Defense Ministry, with training responsibility to CHMAAG; (b) established an Internal Security Council; (c) started the centralization of intelligence services; (d) given attention to the matter of provincial and village councils, all in the CIP. CINCPAC states that SVN forces now accept CI operations as their primary mission.
26 Feb 61					
27 Feb 61					26. CT working committee briefs SecDef Tman on military aspects of CIP.
5 Mar 61					27. Chief MAAG protests against Parsons letter (20) to CINCPAC, message readdressed to JCS. Defends planned balance of infantry regts and Ranger cys. in proposed 20,000-man buildup. While CI is primary, cannot overlook threat of external aggression. Notion that rangers are principal military forces that can effectively engage VC is misconception and oversimplification. Regt. organization provides required control and coordination as well as support for sustained operations, more effective than cys.
6 Mar 61					28. Chief MAAG sees Diem, urges approval of CIP and implementation as an entity, to include unification of top command structure, conduct of military chain of command, and the development of an overall military operations plan. Diem states he is in general accord with MAAG, says he intends soon to designate Field Command as the unified commander under which all operations are to be conducted through a regular chain of command. Diem defends system under which authority divided between PC s and Military Region Commanders (MRC). Defends lack of offensive action against VC on grounds has lacked sufficient troops, says unconventional warfare not understood by many U.S. as well as SVN military men.

2-26-63-11

~~TOP SECRET~~

<u>DATE</u>	<u>PRESIDENT</u>	<u>STATE</u>	<u>DEFENSE</u>	<u>CINCPAC</u>	<u>COUNTRY TEAM</u>
9 Mar 61					29. Ambassador replies to State suggestions (24). Appreciates high level Washington interest, says SVN can survive if accepts comprehensive CIP, effective military command/control structure, proper utilization of forces, coordinated intelligence, political liberalization; if not, problematical even with force increase.
16 Mar 61		30. Replies to Saigon on reaction to suggestions (29).			
18 Mar 61		a. Not intended that balance of specialists in MAAG to be disrupted. b. Asks reconsideration of use of U.K./Malay or other third country personnel, perhaps in CG program, under U.S. command, so that U.S. not sole supporter of SVN and because additional others easier for ICC to accept than U.S. c. Question of additional Rangers put aside to be reviewed in Sept. in light of situation. d. Concurs unwise to press further land reform now. e. Concurs in not providing CIP equipment until GVN accepts CIP, but should not push GVN too hard since success of CIP depends on voluntary cooperation. f. Asks for plan for training additional 35,000 CG and cost estimates.	31. Comments to JCS on CT response to State (29), says he agrees with CT on military courses of action, but noneconours in proposal to support full 68,000 CG. Calls this a stop gap means which in the long run could jeopardize U.S. effort to get GVN approval on the entire CIP, and provide Diem a chance to further delay decision on unpalatable aspects.	a. Supports DOD identification of CI experts, but calls for MAAG requisitioning to insure proper balance between CI and other specialists. b. Opposes introduction of U.K. and Malay advisers, Malays experience already studied and incorporated in MAAG treatise; opposes division of U.S. advisory role and raises Geneva accord problem. c. Recommends MAP support of entire CG, approx. 68,000, instead of 32,000. d. Opposes additional Ranger companies due to lack of command/control and likelihood of assignment to FO's for static defense. e. Forwards MAAG study, Tactics and Techniques for CI in SVN, to be basis for detailed operational planning under CIP. f. Questions practicability starting new land reform program; critical areas too insecure; old program only half finished and not working well. g. Defends ongoing prisoner treatment and rehabilitation program. h. Mentions repeated meetings with GVN officials, MAAG urging operational plan, preparation of implementing directives; warns GVN will delay and procrastinate unless highly pressured, may require strong personal message from JFK to Diem.	
24 Mar 61					32. CT committee meets with SecDef Thuan to identify areas of disagreement on CIP. GVN feels it cannot finance its portion, unwilling to appoint opposition members to cabinet or to eliminate Can Lao party, opposes single line of logistics responsibility or a single engineer service.
27 Mar 61				33. CINCPAC reports that GVN has not accepted CIP in entirety but has taken certain actions in support of it:	
28 Mar 61		34. Lt. Gen. T.J.H. Trapnell reports to SecDef on visit to SVN. Concurs with CT that CIP must be accepted by GVN and supported by U.S. (to date Diem has accepted about 80% of CIP) Questions CT control and coordination of purely military matters as delaying or thwarting military plans and recommendations of Chief MAAG, and asks for use of direct military channels on military matters. Notes possibility MAAG strength may have to be increased despite ICC ceiling. Recommends MAP support for 170,000 on same basis as 150,000 (i.e., including Direct support), MAP for full 68,000 CG, expedited action on supply of carbines and radios for CG.	a. Formed GVN Joint Inter-national Security Committee to direct national CI effort; b. Start of plans to delineate authority and responsibility for unified operations under single chain of command, eliminate Military Regions and redeploy forces under 3 corps commanders; c. Redeploy forces to conduct CI operations as matter of first priority while maintaining deterrent against external attack. d. Transferred CG to DOD; e. Favorable considering organization of a National Intelligence Agency.		
31 Mar 61		35. JCS agrees to ask SecDef 36. and CINCPAC to act on Trapnell recommendation (34) as follows: SecDef to take further action required to obtain U.S. support of CIP, to study the question of military rather than CT channels for military decisions (action would be interdepartmental and require Presidential approval) and to note possibility of MAAG increase if CINCPAC so recommends. CINCPAC to provide views on direct support for 170,000 (subject of interdepartmental controversy affecting wide range of budgetary and programming matters), and on MAP support for 68,000 CG (which CINCPAC has opposed). CINCPAC also to take action he deems appropriate in expediting supply items.	Accompanies Ambassador and Chief MAAG to meetings with Diem. CINCPAC gives Diem resume of SEATO military planning, assures Diem all members willing to contribute forces if situation requires. Diem raises Laos question and advocates U.S. intervention to establish a pro-West regime; also makes a pitch for support of extra 20,000 regulars and for 68,000 CG. Says he would like to use CHINAT troops in SVN, suggested use of SVN troops rather than U.S. troops if open war developed in RVN. CINCPAC raised question of CIP, Diem said main lines had been discussed with Security Council and Thuan (Min Def) had been instructed to work out details with ChMAAG. Agreed key was offensive action under a good plan but said he must have means, and plan must be based on realities in the country. Was sure he and MAAG could agree on this.	37. ChMAAG request to CINCPAC and ISA for authority to issue MAP material and supplies to carefully selected and qualified CG units beyond 32,000 authorized in FY 61 and to program MAP support for the full CG in FY 62.	
31 Mar 61		38. JCS summarizes actions on Trapnell recommendation (34). Defers to judgment of Ambassador and USOM on DS of full 170,000, but says would expedite GVN acceptance of CIP. Mentions CINCPAC had opposed proposal to support full CG but now recommends provision of MAP to carefully selected and qualified units beyond the 32,000 now authorized and full support in FY 62. Says action has been taken by CINCPAC on expediting carbines and radios for the CG.			

~~TOP SECRET~~

<u>DATE</u>	<u>PRESIDENT</u>	<u>STATE</u>	<u>DEFENSE</u>	<u>CINCPAC</u>	<u>COUNTRY TEAM</u>
1 Apr 61				39. Reports to JCS that Diem will preserve both military and civilian channels, with PC wearing two hats; Diem will not turn all power over to the military and insists on split power lines. Agrees to small national intelligence coordinating agency with responsibility limited to coordinations, but claims it is difficult to find a qualified man. Opposes a single logistics command to combine civilian and military engineer activities due to danger of corruption, but J-4 of the JCS will coordinate. CIP is being translated into sections for appropriate use; SVN planning to use some actions as basis for drafting doctrine and SOP's.	40. U.S. and SVN sign treaty of amity and economic relations in Saigon.
3 Apr 61					
5 Apr 61				41. Comments to JCS on modified State suggestions for immediate actions (31). Says CHMAAG is in best position to determine MAAG personnel requirements, action to identify qualified men o.k., but action to acquire should be initiated by MAAG. Nonconcur in acquisition of British advisers, in accord with previous position as incompatible with British co-chairmanship and no more palatable to ICG; but no objection to exploring possibility of Asian nationals. Concur on deferral of question on extra Ranger companies.	
6 Apr 61	42. JFK and MacMillan discuss steps to prevent deterioration of situation in SVN. It is announced that the U.S. will increase military aid to SVN.				
7 Apr 61			43. DOS spokesman tells press that the U.S. is determined to support SVN. NYHT reports that the U.S. has approved a 20,000-man increase in the SVN army proposed by Diem.		
8 Apr 61			44. Relays to Saigon U.K. offer to provide intelligence personnel to SVN, to train Vietnamese in Malayan jungle warfare school or send jungle warfare personnel to SVN, and to help SVN handle Montagnard resettlement on basis of experience resettling aborigines in Malaya. State says offer is useful and should be accepted within context of CIP. Suggests CT to work out general lines of integration in CIP.		
12 Apr 61			45. Deputy SecDef memo to the CJCS on Trappell report (3A-35). Supports efforts to get full acceptance of CIP by Diem. Says ISA is now taking up with State the question of direct communication by CHMAAG through military channels. Also that if JCS determines MAAG increase is needed, will consider at that time.		
13 Apr 61					46. Reports to State on 24 Mar meeting between CT staff group and GVN group (32). Says GVN changes on military actions relatively few and if proposed actions are carried out by GVN, represents considerable progress in arriving at agreed CIP. On political aide U.S. proposals sidestepped or opposed. On bringing into government one or two responsible oppositionists, CT group told Diem said only those who accept policy of GVN can serve; and on permitting press and legislative more freedom, told that both are being given more latitude in questioning and criticism; altering or disbanding Can Lao not necessary.
2 May 61					
4 May 61					
15 Apr 61					47. Embassy proposes to State that MAP procurement for extra 20,000 force proceed on long lead-time equipment, warranted by progress in arriving at agreed CIP, but without informing GVN yet in order to maintain pressure on further progress. Reports that 13 April Diem issued decree abolishing MR's, creating 3 corps zones in accord with CIP. Also that greater authority has been delegated to RVMAF general staff, GVN has agreed on a national planning system and is making some progress in implementing, but (a) no decree giving Field Command operational control and no action activating logistics command at corps, (b) Chief of Central Intelligence not yet appointed, (c) no implementation of basic reorganization and decentralization of government and delegation of authority as announced by Diem in February.
2 May 61			48. JCS sends CINCPAC list of five Presidential approved actions intended to stiffen SVN resistance.		
4 May 61	49. Senator Fulbright, after conference with JFK, tells press he would not oppose direct U.S. intervention in SVN and Thailand to counter takeover threat (but would oppose in Laos) SVN and Thailand willing to defend themselves.	50. Rusk announces at press conference U.S. will give added military and economic aid to SVN. Says situation cannot be dealt with solely in military terms. Also no reason Laos settlement would produce relaxation in SVN.			
5 May 61	51. Tells press conference U.S. is considering intervention with U.S. forces if necessary to help SVN. One of subjects to be discussed in forthcoming VP visit to SVN, 11 May.				

2-26-63-13

~~TOP SECRET~~

<u>DATE</u>	<u>PRESIDENT</u>	<u>STATE</u>	<u>DEFENSE</u>	<u>CINCPAC</u>	<u>COUNTRY TEAM</u>	
9 May 61			52. JCS asks CINCPAC views on plan under study by SecDef to commit U.S. forces to SVN, in order to provide deterrence of further communist aggression from NVN, China, or USSR; to rally morale of SVN; to encourage SEATO and Neutral countries to support SVN. Actions under consideration: a. Send two U.S. battle groups with support units to establish two divisional field training areas; b. Assign PACFLT to coastal patrol using small forces in conjunction with SVN to counter VC infiltration; c. Assign PACAF to border surveillance and close support of SVN ground forces using a small USAF group.			
11 May 61			53. JCS outlines to CINCPAC plan to move U.S. troops into SVN in order to provide visible deterrent to potential NVN or CG action, release SVN forces from static defense positions and engage in CI actions, assist training RVNAF, provide nucleus for any additional major U.S. or SEATO operations in SEA. JCS recommends that troops come from U.S. in order to preserve flexibility of PACOM forces.			
12 May 61				54. Recommends to JCS that if U.S. troops are sent to SVN, forces should consist of a USA infantry division reinforced with Army aviation units, engineers, artillery, and a tailored logistical command. Asks coastal patrol to remain a GVN function with some U.S. assistance from 7th Fleet as normally deployed. Asks for 8 B-57's for border surveillance, close support, and 4 F-102's for possible air defense and counter-air operation and possibly 2-3 reconnaissance aircraft. Suggests designating Chief MAAG as Commander, U.S. Forces Vietnam to exercise operational control of all U.S. forces in SVN, under CINCPAC.	55. After talks with Dies, Johnson tells National Assembly U.S. is ready to support expanded army immediately. (NYT says U.S. is prepared to increase \$150 million military aid by \$40 million a year. London Times reports Dies told Johnson he has enough manpower in his forces but needs more help in training and equipment.)	
13 May 61				56. Joint Johnson-Dies communique on additional U.S. military and economic aid. (NYT reports agreement to expand MAAG to 1,650.)		
19 May 61				57. Chief MAAG reports that 280,000-man force level and 15 divisions needed to meet internal and external threat. Recommends immediate approval and full support for two more divisions of 15,000 men each.		
20 May 61		58. Sends Saigon complete Presidential program for SVN (48) with instructions to carry out on a priority basis and with a sense of urgency: a. Install radar surveillance system in SVN; b. MAF support and training for 20,000-man force increase; c. Consider need for increase beyond 170,000-man level; d. Extend MAF support for entire CO of 68,000; e. Increase MAAG to extent necessary to carry out program; f. Support SDG; g. Support Junk Force; h. Speed up training of SVN Special Forces; i. Help RVNAF carry out health, welfare, public works programs in villages; j. Study with SVN border control problem; k. Study setting up SEA facility to develop and test new techniques.				
9 Jun 61				59. In comment on ChMAAG (57) statement of force requirements, doubts that 15 divisions needed, recommends 9 division goal; recommends that ChMAAG develop detailed plans for 30,000 force increase to get under way in 1962 provided GVN demonstrated need and ability to use. Urges that U.S. and GVN first try to organize, train, equip 20,000 man increase, 68,000 CG, 40,000 SDG, and carry out rotation and retraining of existing forces.		
16 Jun 61			60. Announces increase in 685-man MAAG, assignment of specialists to direct training, sending U.S. officers into field to observe RVNAF performance. 150,000-man army to be increased to 170,000; \$40 million more military aid; provision of arms for all as against a part of 60,000-man CG.			
19 Jun 61					61. U.S. financial, economic, military experts headed by Eugene A. Staley arrive in SVN to study methods of countering guerrillas and to establish long term plans to aid SVN economy.	



~~TOP SECRET~~

<u>DATE</u>	<u>PRESIDENT</u>	<u>STATE</u>	<u>DISPENSE</u>	<u>CINCPAC</u>	<u>COUNTRY TEAM</u>
7 Jul 61			62. JCS asks CINCPAC for summary of principles, planned phases, status of military operational plan of GVN for systematic clearing of VC. Says extent to which GVN has adopted and is implementing operations concepts of 4 Jun Embassy dispatch on CIF is not clear in Washington. Asks extent to which concept of geographical assignment of line units is being universally applied. Also asks CINCPAC evaluation of concepts set forth in Thompson report to GVN 13 April '60 and applicability to SVN.		
8 Jul 61				63. Asks JCS for copy of Thompson report (62).	
4 Aug 61			64. JCS recommends to SecDef that RVNAF be increased to 200,000, with periodic assessment during buildup to determine need for additional forces.		
11 Aug 61	65. Authorizes increase of RVNAF to 200,000.				
15 Aug 61			66. JCS advise CINCPAC that in order to guarantee effectiveness of RVNAF before 170,000-man level reached, U.S. wants to be sure that mutually acceptable geographically phased plan for combating the VC exists, that there be U.S.-GVN understanding on training and use of additional 30,000 troops, and that rate of increase can be regulated to permit efficient use of new men.		
19 Sep 61				67. Asks OSD to secure early State approval for introduction of jet aircraft into SVN.	
19 Sep 61				68. Meeting with Diem on occasion of CINCPAC visit, with Ambassador ChMAAG, others. Diem asks for bilateral defense treaty.	
29 Sep 61					69. ChMAAG suggests (to OSD) defoliation project (Operation Ranch Hand): border areas, known VC strongholds, tapioca plants.
3 Oct 61					71. Ambassador tells State he backs defoliation project (Ranch Hand), provided aircraft carry civilian markings and crews wear civilian clothes (69).
5 Oct 61			70. JCS recommends that CINCPAC give priority consideration to placing an element of 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron (CCTS) with MAAG, to train VNAF and to participate in R&W testing of CI techniques.		
11 Oct 61			72. JCS informs CINCPAC that part of the CCTS would be sent to SVN, and authorizes CINCPAC to coordinate with CofS, USAF.	73. Tells JCS that Oplan 32-99 is a plan to "win"; phases 3 and 4 anticipate a war progressing from guerrilla warfare to full-scale war with the communists. Indicates that U.S. could expect sufficient forces from SEA countries to lend a SEALV label. Lists forces for phases 3 and 4 and SEATO forces that could be expected. CE	
12 Oct 61			74. JCS asks CINCPAC, in view of possibility that increased aid to SVN might prod communists into open hostilities, to list augmentation he would need to win a war if NVN and CU intervened. (Request made originally by telecon.) (73)		75. ChMAAG asks OSD for six spray-equipped aircraft for Ranch Hand (69).
13 Oct 61					76. Sec. Thuan asks Ambassador for: a. Additional squadron of AD-6 aircraft in lieu of T-28's; b. U.S. civilian pilots for helicopters and C-47's for "noncombat" operations; c. U.S. combat units or "combat-trainer" units to be introduced near 17th parallel and some province capitals in central SVN. d. U.S. reaction to a request for 1 CHIMAR division for combat operations in SW SVN.  Thuan confirms that Diem's views against introducing U.S. troops have changed in lieu of worsening security situation.  Ambassador asks for serious and prompt consideration of Thuan's requests.
16 Oct 61					77. Ambassador reports to State that the major factors causing GVN anxiety and requests for a bilateral treaty and U.S. troops are the situation in Laos and the GVN conviction that the approaching solution there is going to transfer communist pressure to SVN. Reports failure to persuade Diem that U.S. policy in Laos is not inconsistent with a U.S. determination to protect SVN. Ambassador suggests there may be no alternative to going all out to reinforce SVN internally, with even faster, more far-reaching, and more expensive measures.

2-26-63-15

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

<u>DATE</u>	<u>PRESIDENT</u>	<u>STATE</u>	<u>DEFENSE</u>	<u>CINCPAC</u>	<u>COUNTRY TEAM</u>	
17 Oct 61			78. JCS asks CINCPAC whether GVN has satisfied agreed conditions for buildup from 170,000 to 200,000: a. Existence of mutually agreed geographically-phased strategic plan against the VC; b. Understanding on the training and employment of extra 30,000 men; c. Regulation of the rate of increase to permit most efficient absorption and utilization of personnel and equipment, with due regard to SVN resources.			
17 Oct 61			79. SecDef proposes that careful review of RVNAP buildup be made early in 1962.			
18 Oct 61					80. In meeting with Gen. Taylor, Diem retreats from Thuan's request for U.S. combat troops at the present time, accepting contingency planning for their introduction. Taylor urges Diem for an overall national plan, offensive spirit and action.	
18 Oct 61					81. Ambassador opposes introducing jet aircraft into SVN because of Geneva Accords.	
18 Oct 61				82. Submits to JCS list of military actions short of introducing U.S. combat forces which can and should be taken at once provided satisfactory diplomatic arrangements can be made with GVN, both to support GVN and to support U.S. forces when and if introduced. a. Deploy two USA helicopter companies to augment airlift; b. Prepare to deploy quickly Jungle Jim squadrons; c. Accelerate delivery of T-28 aircraft for close support; d. Have CIA expand contacts in SVN immediately; e. Continue photo reconnaissance; f. Construct POL facilities; g. Improve Pleiku airfield; h. Construct Attepeu-Kontum road; i. Preposition in SVN stores of ammunition, communication equipment, other war consumables.		
19 Oct 61					83. "Big" Minh, Commander of SVN Field Command, complains to Taylor that military are not being properly supported by GVN. GVN is losing support of the people, PC's not cooperating.	
19 Oct 61			84. JCS comments to CINCPAC on GVN 13 Oct 61 requests (7b): a. Recommends T-28's instead of AD aircraft unless CT is absolutely insistent; b. Approves in principle request for civilian pilots for helicopters and transports for "non-combat" operations, and requests field estimate of requirements; c. Defers comment on introduction of U.S. combat units pending conclusion of Taylor visit; d. Says introduction of CHINAT's may be considered in the light of overall force requirements, but U.S. reaction at this time is negative.			
21 Oct 61				85. Tells JCS he cannot predict results of defoliation, but is dubious of project to defoliate entire border, since it cannot be patrolled adequately. (b9)		
23 Oct 61				86. Urges CHMAAG to obtain a copy of the GVN campaign plan for military action as part of overall OIP. Cites need to see an overall plan setting forth targets, scheme of maneuver, time-phased priorities.		
24 Oct 61					87. In meeting with Diem and Thuan Taylor proposes, as personal ideas for informal reaction: a. Joint U.S.-GVN effort to improve intelligence; b. Joint surveys of security situation at provincial levels; c. Improvement in Army mobility with more helicopters and light aircraft; d. Provision of a U.S. flood relief task force for western provinces, largely military (engineer, medical, signal, transport), with combat troops for their protection; would also provide a U.S. military presence in SVN and would constitute a military reserve in case of heightened military crisis.	

2-26-63-16

~~TOP SECRET~~

**TOP SECRET**

<u>DATE</u>	<u>PRESIDENT</u>	<u>STATE</u>	<u>DEFENSE</u>	<u>CINCPAC</u>	<u>COUNTRY TEAM</u>
25 Oct 61					88. CHMAAG tells CINCPAC that RVNAF is convinced it cannot develop a military operations plan setting forth targets, scheme of maneuver, time-phased priorities until it has detailed intelligence on strengths and locations of VC units. RVNAF intends to obtain intelligence by using deep-penetration jungle battalions to locate VC units and bases in remote areas; will then develop specific operations plans for specific targets. Concept takes into account such geographical phasing. CHMAAG will continue to press RVNAF for overall plan soonest (8c).
26 Oct 61					89. Ambassador tells State Dism strongly favors defoliation project (Ranch Hand)(69).
28 Oct 61			90. On CCTS deployment, CINCPAC asks that 4 SC-47's, 4 RB-26's, and 8 T-28's be sent without delay (70).		
31 Oct 61					91. Ambassador tells State of virtually unanimous SVN desire for introduction of U.S. forces. Says lack of intervention in Laos has raised question as to whether the U.S. will give armed support to SVN or back down when the chips are down. Want U.S. forces to demonstrate U.S. will to fight; want reassuring presence of troops, not thinking in terms of U.S. troops fighting VC.
1 Nov 61				92. Tells JCS he does not think GVN has satisfied JCS conditions but recommends against slowing down the RVNAF buildup on assumption Dism will comply under expected increased pressure after Taylor visit to SVN (78).	
3 Nov 61					93. Ambassador asks State for prompt favorable decision on defoliation project (69).
5 Nov 61					94. CCTS aircraft, personnel, equipment begin to arrive in SVN. All aircraft with RVNAF markings (70).
6 Nov 61					95. CHMAAG urges prompt favorable decision on defoliation project (69).
8 Nov 61			96. JCS informs field that decision on defoliation depends upon the problem of possible communist charges.		
10 Nov 61			97. SecDef directs USAF to furnish 6 C-123 spray-equipped aircraft to CINCPAC on priority basis (69).		
10 Nov 61				98. Directs PACAF to assume operational control of defoliation aircraft for the conduct of operations, assigns planning and coordination responsibility to CHMAAG. Directs CHMAAG to submit plan for time-phased operations (69).	
16 Nov 61				99. Inform CHMAAG that primary mission of CCTS detachment is to conduct tactical training of VNAF (70).	
20 Nov 61			100. JCS directs two USA helicopter companies deployed to western Pacific in anticipation of deployment to SVN.		
20 Nov 61				101. Recommends to JCS intelligence plan for SVN. Provides for: a. Integration of U.S. intelligence specialists into intelligence staffs of RVNAF JCS and ARVN Field Command; b. Assignment of MAAG intelligence advisers to each RVNAF corps, division, and province HQ; c. Augmenting MAAG J-2 intelligence and evaluation center; d. Establishment of a U.S. intelligence/operations radio net.	
27 Nov 61			102. JCS asks CINCPAC views regarding use of CCTS aircraft for combat operations (70).		
28 Nov 61				103. Fully concurs in use of CCTS aircraft for combat operations where such operations are extension of the Jungle Jim (CCTS) mission (70).	
29 Nov 61				104. Gives JCS his views on establishment of unified command in SVN, with proposed organization and terms of reference, to have single spokesman. CHMAAG to retain responsibility for administration and training in connection with MAP (34).	
2 Dec 61					105. CHMAAG submits requirements for additional personnel and aircraft to support the MAAG.

2-26-63-17

**TOP SECRET**

~~TOP SECRET~~

<u>DATE</u>	<u>PRESIDENT</u>	<u>STATE</u>	<u>DEFENSE</u>	<u>CINCPAC</u>	<u>COUNTRY TEAM</u>	
3 Dec 61				106. Asks JCS to seek SecDef approval for the U.S. military to furnish a troposcatter communications network in SVN, in view of lack of urgency in AID section.		
4 Dec 61			107. JCS changes orders on deployment of helicopter companies: two enroute to go directly to SVN and a third ordered deployed. Mission to fly support missions for RVNAF for which SVN pilots not yet qualified, and to help training (100).			
4 Dec 61			108. JCS tells field President o.k.'s defoliation project for December, limited to defoliation of key routes, operations not to proceed until revised and detailed plan approved (69).			
6 Dec 61			109. Directs ChMAAG to submit detailed defoliation plan listing selected areas (69).			
6 Dec 61			110. Asks ChMAAG to consult JCS approves use of CCMs (Jungle Jim) aircraft on combat missions, with combined U.S./SVN crews aboard (70).			
6 Dec 61				112. Sends ChMAAG outline plan prepared by his staff for systematic military campaign against VC, leaving CIP as primary instrument for coordinating U.S. and GVN government-level efforts. Objectives to gain control of critical areas, key facilities, majority of population by military operations, designed to place maximum combat strength of RVNAF into offensive actions; and to maintain a posture near the 17th parallel to deter overt aggression (86).		
7 Dec 61			113. SecDef and JCS approve CINCPAC Intelligence plan, authorize addition of about 180 intelligence personnel to MAAG (101).			
8 Dec 61					114. ChMAAG again recommends ultimate RVNAF of 278,000 as goal for 1967.	
9 Dec 61			115. DA, in response to ChMAAG request for additional personnel and aircraft for MAAG, proposes that units would satisfy the requirement better than individuals and aircraft.			
10 Dec 61			116. JCS asks SecDef approval for CINCPAC proposition that military handle troposcatter network in SVN instead of AID (106).			
13 Dec 61				117. Approves DA proposal for aircraft units rather than ind. aircraft and personnel (105).		
14 Dec 61					118. ChMAAG submits to CINCPAC defoliation plan. Areas total 241 square kilometers (69).	
15 Dec 61					119. Ambassador directs that no Jungle Jim combat mission be flown until authorized by him (70).	
16 Dec 61					120. At SecDef conference, ChMAAG asks for 25,000 increase above authorized 200,000-man force level, including 5,000 contingency spaces to meet urgent requirements. Sec Def indicates he would favor an increase beyond 200,000 if it was necessary. CINCPAC suggests that an increase in the CG would be more desirable.	
20 Dec 61				121. CINCPAC returns ChMAAG's defoliation plan as too general; sends his own proposed plan (69).		
21 Dec 61					122. ChMAAG tells CINCPAC Diem showed little enthusiasm when CINCPAC outline military plan shown to him. Diem reluctant to delegate authority and control of forces to his commanders (86).	
22 Dec 61			124. JCS alerts army aviation for movement to SVN: 1 Army fixed wing co., 1 Hq and Hq detachment of a transport aircraft battalion, 1 signal detachment (105).	123. Recommends that JCS approve the 5,000 contingency spaces requested by ChMAAG, but that consideration of RVNAF force increase beyond 200,000 be deferred pending the evaluation of GVN actions against the VC (120).		
23 Dec 61				126. Asks OASD/ISA for permission to transfer excess MAP items to [ ]	125. ChMAAG tells CINCPAC he needs authority to support Father Hoa's guerrillas (110).	
26 Dec 61				127. JCS tells CINCPAC that in Jungle Jim aircraft, mixed crews are to be used in combat missions when VNAF lacks capability due to lack of training, such flights to train VNAF personnel to fly combat missions on their own (70).		
19 Jan 62				128. OSD authorizes transfer of excess MAP items to [ ]		

2-26-63-18

~~TOP SECRET~~

clean

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED~~

Copy 18 of 20 copies  
each of 12 sheets

WSEG  
FILE COPY

Mr. Ponturo  
27 February 1963

RETIREMENT COPY  
1967

INVENTORY APR 9 1963

LOANED

FIRST DRAFT

INVENTORY FEB 12 1975

C-I NO. 3 WORKING PAPER NO. 1

INVENTORY OCT 21 1968

CHRONOLOGY OF CERTAIN ACTIONS BY U.S. ACTORS IN THE SOUTH VIETNAM SITUATION, APRIL 1960 - JANUARY 1962

THIS DOCUMENT AS A WHOLE IS CLASSIFIED ~~TOP SECRET~~.  
INDIVIDUAL PORTIONS AND ATTACHMENTS HERETO  
CARRY THEIR APPROPRIATE CLASSIFICATION.

INVENTORY JAN 24 1972

"NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION"  
"Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to  
Criminal Sanctions"

INVENTORY

EXCLUDED FROM THE GDS

GROUP - 1

~~EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION~~

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

Reproduction of this document in whole or in part is prohibited except  
with permission of the issuing office. It will not be removed from the  
WSEG area in the Pentagon without approval of the Executive Secretary

Please sign opposite your name and fill in the required information

Routing	Signature	Date		Remarks (Indicate portions read)
		Received	Released	

Return this document to TS/LD Section, Room 1E880, PERSONALLY, or call  
77313 for pickup. Do not release to Messengers, Area Control Clerks or  
anyone else. Make sure you obtain your receipt upon return of this document.

STCS/DOC DIV  
P-3  
637A

QASD(PA) DFOISK 63-TS-72

~~TOP SECRET~~

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

80 F O I 997 Doc 7 LOG No. TS-63-105/1



506

C-I NO. 3 WORKING PAPER NO. 1

PREFACE

This paper is a first-cut attempt to structure a consecutive pattern of decisions and actions in the South Vietnam situation. The purpose of issuing it is to see where we are and where we are going.

The following points are in order:

The chronology is incomplete, with many omissions and many loose ends hanging. I have only been through a small percent of the major documents. I have spotted hardly any Presidential actions, for example, and none of the Task Force deliberations.

The chief U.S. actors are shown as President, State, Defense, CINCPAC, and Country Team. It will ultimately be preferable to break up at least Defense and Country Team into several actors for each, to add other actors like Government of South Vietnam and the Communist Bloc countries, and to provide these actors with "scenery" in the sense of situational context.

The actions shown are a rather miscellaneous set, because I do not yet have sufficiently matured clues as to what is going to be important in the story.

Cross-referencing of the actions (numbers in parentheses) is an initial attempt to tie together some of the obvious subplots of the story.

Some of the peculiar abbreviations used are:

ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
CC	Communist China
CG	Civil Guard
CI	Counter-Insurgency
CIP	Counter-Insurgency Plan
CT	Country Team

GVN	Government of South Vietnam
JGS	Joint General Staff of South Vietnam
MR	Military Region
MRC	Military Region Commander
NVN	North Vietnam
PC	Province Chief
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
SDC	Self-Defense Corps
SEA	Southeast Asia
SVN	South Vietnam
VC	Viet Cong
VNAF	South Vietnam Air Force

~~TOP SECRET~~

<u>DATE</u>	<u>PRESIDENT</u>	<u>STATE</u>	<u>DEFENSE</u>	<u>CINCPAC</u>	<u>COUNTRY TEAM</u>
27 Apr 60				1. Sends JCS a "study" on Counterinsurgency Operations in SVN and Laos, analyzing situation in SVN (and Laos) as critical, requiring GVN to establish emergency operations command/control system to integrate civil/military/political efforts in accord with a real campaign plan. Asks for all U.S. agencies in Washington and in the field to cooperate fully in supporting such a campaign with increased and coordinated advice and aid to GVN. CINCPAC states he intends to use the study as the basis for his actions, but warns they will be fruitless without the support of implementing actions by Washington agencies.	2. Study (1) was put in final form during the PACOM conference of MAAG chiefs the previous week with the collaboration of Chief MAAG Vietnam and Chief PEO Laos, both of whom endorsed it.
5 May 60			3. Announces that MAAG Vietnam will be increased from 327 to 665 members, at request of SVN.		
3 June 60			4. JCS notes the CINCPAC CI Study (1), agrees that prompt and full support of all departments and agencies involved in SEA is essential to effective action by CINCPAC, decides to recommend that the SecDef initiate action to insure that those departments and agencies (a) encourage SVN (and Laos) to adopt a national emergency command organization to integrate civil and military resources and national policies, (b) be authorized and directed to support the CI campaigns, and (c) provide sufficient budgetary and material support to insure success. Copy JCS decision goes to CINCPAC.		
11 June 60			5. Herter writes Gates, mentions possibility of new aggressive moves by CC, including stepped up guerrilla war in SEA. Requests views on whether further measures beyond those programmed would be needed to encounter increased guerrilla war in SVN (and Laos).		
30 June 60				6. Sends JCS a draft outline plan for CI by GVN, asks the JCS to approve and pass to the SecDef for joint State-DOD-ICA action to expand the plan in detail and prepare estimates of U.S. support requirements, before attempting to get the plan accepted by GVN. CINCPAC encloses a draft JCS memo to the SecDef and a draft State-DOD-ICA message to the Ambassador and the CI directing them to develop the outline plan in further detail for Washington review. The outline CIP spells out a command/control organization including a National Emergency Council and a Director of Operations to formulate a national CI plan and assure integration of effort; political economic and psychological measures to win over the people; and beefed-up military, paramilitary and police efforts under centralized direction.	
25 July (7)			7. Douglas (?) replies to Herter (5). Says that SVN is capable of coping with insurgency at the present tempo but that emergency requirements might arise at any time. Recommends a State-Defense working group to coordinate U.S. efforts to (a) obtain needed flexibility to respond rapidly to Red moves, (b) get SVN to adopt a national emergency organization to integrate resources for CI operations and to develop a national CI plan, and (c) provide U.S. material and budgetary support for the GVN CI campaign.		
26 Aug 60			8. JCS agrees to send CINCPAC memo to the SecDef enclosing his outline CIP and his draft interagency directive (6), and to ask the SecDef to initiate appropriate action.		
16 Sept 60			9. Acting SecDef memo to Sec State forwards the JCS memo (8), says he agrees in principle with the JCS views and is making the JCS recommendations and CINCPAC's outline CIP available to enable State-Defense staffs to work together in developing implementing instructions. Cites a recent SNIE on the increasing urgency of the SVN situation.		
(7) 60			10. Passes JCS recommendations (9) to CI as guidance in developing a CIP, directs CI to submit for review by Washington agencies for consistency with U.S. policy and for funding.		
13 Nov 60			11. Expresses satisfaction at failure of coup against Diem (11 Nov), and expresses hope that his powers will be established on a wider basis with implementation of "radical" reforms.		

2-26-63-10

~~TOP SECRET~~



<u>DATE</u>	<u>PRESIDENT</u>	<u>STATE</u>	<u>DEFENSE</u>	<u>CINCPAC</u>	<u>COUNTRY TEAM</u>
4 Jan 61					12. Sends completed CIP to State (10). CIP covers political, economic, military actions, by JVN, CT, and U.S. agencies. Provides for increase of RVNAP strength from 150,000 to 170,000. MAP support of 32,000 Civil Guard (CG). Calls for some broadening and liberalization of Diem regime, and is predicated upon extraordinary US/JVN cooperation.
18 Jan 61					
28 Jan 61	15.				13. Requests 20,000-man increase in RVNAP, after ChMAAG overcomes Ambassador's objections.
31 Jan 61					14. ChMAAG requests authority to permit assignment of U.S. advisers at lower echelons (than battalion) in the RVNAP.
1 Feb 61		18. Proposes State-Defense message to Saigon approving CIP (12) based on funding authorization (13). Suggest Ambassador and Chief MAAG present CIP to Diem. If CT believes JVN will not cooperate should inform SecState and make recommendations, perhaps including suspension of U.S. contribution.	19. JCS refers CT CIP (12) to J-3 for comment and recommendations, asks for report by 1 February.	17. Authorizes ChMAAG to detail MAAG advisors down to battalion hq. in the RVNAP and to the CP's of smaller units when required. Not to include authorization to place advisors forward of battalion or separate smaller units in disputed areas. ChMAAG to take every precaution to avoid assignments exposing U.S. personnel to risk of capture, to embarrassment of USG. (14)	
3 Feb 61		20. Parsons writes Ambassador SVN that State has approved CIP despite reservations on the balance of infantry regiments versus ranger companies in the 20,000-man buildup (18). Question relates to emphasis on CI as against the external threat.	21. DJS memo for JCS on review of CIP. Asks for expeditious JCS approval in view of recent Presidential and State actions. (15 and 18). Says time does not permit review and comments by CEMTSAC and the Services, but that the CINCPAC DORC indicates informally that CINCPAC approval is expected.		
6 Feb 61			22. JCS approves CIP "in principle," subject to possible revisions in support requirements that review by the Services may indicate are necessary or desirable. (21)		
13 Feb 61					23. Ambassador and ChMAAG formally present CIP to Diem. (18)
24 Feb 61		24. Rusk message to Asamb Saigon and CINCPAC Polad states that Pres. ranks defense of SVN among highest priorities U.S. foreign policy; having approved CIP, concerned whether SVN can resist over 18-24 month period before CIP takes full effect; has asked State to study prompt steps to further strengthen SVN. Unless Amb. or CINCPAC object authorized to take following actions without awaiting JVN approval of CIP:			
26 Feb 61		a. On priority basis send MAAG best qualified personnel for CI training, cut short tours of less qualified there now.			
27 Feb 61		b. Incorporate group of U.K. and/or Malay officers into ARVN or CG program.			
5 Mar 61		c. Devise and implement program for training 65 present Ranger companies in 18 months.			
		d. Higher priority activating additional 21 Ranger cys.			
		e. Change CIP to add 40 more Ranger cys. and reduce proposed Infantry regiments proportionately.			
		f. [ ]			
		g. Increase priority on border patrol, village transceivers, civil action.			
		h. With or without JVN participation, prepare overall operations plan, geographically phased, for consolidation of safe areas and consolidation program for newly won areas.			
		i. Step up land distribution and increase peasant income.			
		j. Study treatment of VC prisoners to encourage defections. Consider methods used in F.I. and Burma.			
6 Mar 61					25. Reports to JCS on current military support of CI operations in SVN, states that Ambassador has presented CIP to Diem and that Diem has (a) transferred the CG to the Defense Ministry, with training responsibility to ChMAAG; (b) established an Internal Security Council; (c) started the centralization of intelligence services; (d) given attention to the matter of provincial and village councils, all in the CIP. CINCPAC states that SVN forces now accept CI operations as their primary mission.
					26. CT working committee briefs SecDef Thuan on military aspects of CIP.
					27. Chief MAAG protests against Parsons letter (20) to CINCPAC, message readressed to JCS. Defends planned balance of infantry regts and Ranger cys. in proposed 20,000-man buildup. While CI is primary, cannot overlook threat of external aggression. Notion that rangers are principal military forces that can effectively engage VC is misconception and oversimplification. Regt. organization provides required control and coordination as well as support for sustained operations, more effective than cys.
					28. Chief MAAG sees Diem, urges approval of CIP and implementation as an entity, to include unification of top command structure, conduct of military chain of command, and the development of an overall military operations plan. Diem states he is in general accord with MAAG, says he intends soon to designate Field Command as the unified commander under which all operations are to be conducted through a regular chain of command. Diem defends system under which authority divided between FC and Military Region Commanders (MRC). Defends lack of offensive action against VC on grounds has lacked sufficient troops, says unconventional warfare not understood by many U.S. as well as JVN military men.

DATE	PRESIDENCY	STATE	DEFENSE	CINCPAC	COUNTRY TEAM
9 Mar 61					29. Ambassador replies to State suggestions (24). Appreciates high level Washington interest, says SVN can survive if accepts comprehensive CIP, effective military command/control structure, proper utilization of forces, coordinated intelligence, political liberalization; if not, problematical even with force increase.
16 Mar 61		30. Replies to Saigon on reaction to suggestions (29).			a. Supports DOD identification of CI experts, but calls for MAAG requisitioning to insure proper balance between CI and other specialists.
18 Mar 61		a. Not intended that balance of specialists in MAAG to be disrupted.		31. Comments to JCS on CT response to State (29), says he agrees with CT on military courses of action, but concurs in proposal to support full 68,000 CG. Calls this a stop gap means which in the long run could jeopardize U.S. effort to get GVN approval on the entire CIP, and provide Dien a chance to further delay decision on unpalatable aspects.	b. Opposes introduction of U.K. and Malay advisers, Malaya experience already studied and incorporated in MAAG training; opposes division of U.S. advisory role and raises Geneva accord problem.
		b. Asks reconsideration of use of U.K./Malay or other third country personnel, perhaps in CG program, under U.S. command, so that U.S. not sole supporter of SVN and because additional others easier for ICC to accept than U.S.			c. Opposes additional Ranger companies due to lack of command/control and likelihood of assignment to FG's for static defense.
		c. Question of additional Rangers put aside to be reviewed in Sept. in light of situation.			d. Forwards MAAG study, Tactics and Techniques for CI in SVN, to be basis for detailed operational planning under CIP.
		d. Concurs unwise to press further land reform now.			e. Questions practicability starting new land reform program: critical areas too insecure; old program only half finished and not working well.
		e. Concurs in not providing CIP equipment until GVN accepts CIP, but should not push GVN too hard since success of CIP depends on voluntary cooperation.			f. Defends ongoing prisoner treatment and rehabilitation program.
		f. Asks for plan for training additional 36,000 CG and cost estimates.			g. Mentions repeated meetings with GVN officials, MAAG urging operational plan, preparation of implementing directives; warns GVN will delay and procrastinate unless highly pressured, may require strong personal message from JFK to Dien.
24 Mar 61					32. CT committee meets with SecDef Thuan to identify areas of disagreement on CIP. GVN feels it cannot finance its portion, unwilling to appoint opposition members to cabinet or to eliminate Can Lao party, opposes single line of logistics responsibility or a single engineer service.
27 Mar 61				33. CINCPAC reports that GVN has not accepted CIP in entirety but has taken certain positions in support of it:	
28 Mar 61			34. Lt. Gen. T.J.K. Trappell reports to SecDef on visit to SVN. Concurs with CT that CIP must be accepted by GVN and supported by U.S. (to date Dien has accepted about 80% of CIP). Questions CT control and coordination of purely military matters as delaying or thwarting military plans and recommendations of Chief MAAG, and asks for use of direct military channels on military matters. Notes possibility MAAG strength may have to be increased despite ICC ceiling. Recommends MAP support for 170,000 on same basis as 150,000 (i.e., including Direct Support), MAP for full 68,000 CG, expedited action on supply of carbines and radios for CG.	a. Formed GVN Joint Internal Security Committee to direct national CI effort;	
				b. Start of plans to delineate authority and responsibility for unified operations under single chain of command, eliminate Military Regions and redeploy forces under 3 corps commanders;	
				c. Redeploy forces to conduct CI operations as matter of first priority while maintaining deterrent against external attack.	
				d. Transferred CG to DOD;	
				e. Favorable considering organization of a National Intelligence Agency.	
31 Mar 61			35. JCS agrees to ask SecDef and CINCPAC to act on Trappell recommendations (34) as follows: SecDef to take further action required to obtain U.S. support of CIP, to study the question of military rather than CT channels for military decisions (action would be interdepartmental and require Presidential approval), and to note possibility of MAAG increase if CINCPAC so recommends. CINCPAC to provide views on direct support for 170,000 (subject of interdepartmental controversy affecting wide range of budgetary and programming matters), and on MAP support for 68,000 CG (which CINCPAC has opposed). CINCPAC also to take action he deems appropriate in expediting supply items.	36. Accompanies Ambassador and Chief MAAG to meetings with Dien. CINCPAC gives Dien resume of SEARU military planning, assures Dien all members willing to contribute forces if situation requires. Dien raises Laos question and advocates U.S. intervention to establish a pro-West regime; also makes a pitch for support of extra 20,000 regulars and for 68,000 CG. Says he would like to use CHINAT troops in SVN, suggested use of SVN troops if open war developed in NVN. CINCPAC raised question of CIP, Dien said main lines had been discussed with Security Council and Thuan (Min Def) had been instructed to work out details with CHMAAG. Agreed key was offensive action under a good plan but said he must have means, and plan must be based on realities in the country. Was sure he and MAAG could agree on this.	37. CHMAAG request to CINCPAC and ISA for authority to issue MAP material and supplies to carefully selected and qualified CG units beyond 32,000 authorized in FY 61 and to program MAP support for the full CG in FY 62.
31 Mar 61			38. JCS summarizes actions on Trappell recommendation (34). Defers to judgment of Ambassador and USOM on DE of full 170,000, but says would expedite GVN acceptance of CIP. Mentions CINCPAC had opposed proposal to support full CG but now recommends provision of MAP to carefully selected and qualified units beyond the 32,000 now authorized and full support in FY '62. Says action has been taken by CINCPAC on expediting carbines and radios for the CG.		

**TOP SECRET**

<u>DATE</u>	<u>PRESIDENT</u>	<u>STATE</u>	<u>DEFENSE</u>	<u>CINCPAC</u>	<u>COUNTRY TEAM</u>
1 Apr 61					
3 Apr 61				39. Reports to JCS that Diem will preserve both military and civilian channels, with FC wearing two hats; Diem will not turn all power over to the military and insist on split power lines. Agrees to small national intelligence coordinating agency with responsibility limited to coordination, but claims it is difficult to find a qualified man. Opposes a single logistics command to combine civilian and military engineer activities due to danger of corruption, but J-4 of the JCS will coordinate. CIP is being translated into sections for appropriate use; SVN planning to use some actions as basis for drafting doctrine and SOP's.	40. U.S. and SVN sign treaty of amity and economic relations in Saigon.
5 Apr 61				41. Comments to JCS on modified State suggestions for immediate actions (31). Says CHNMAAD is in best position to determine MAAG personnel requirements, action to identify qualified men O.K., but action to acquire should be initiated by MAAG. Nonconcourse in acquisition of British advisers, in accord with previous position as incompatible with British co-chairmanship and no more palatable to ICC; but no objection to exploring possibility of Asian nationals. Concurs on deferral of question on extra Ranger companies.	
6 Apr 61	42. JFK and MacMillan discuss steps to prevent deterioration of situation in SVN. It is announced that the U.S. will increase military aid to SVN.				
7 Apr 61			43. DOS spokesman tells press that the U.S. is determined to support SVN. WHH reports that the U.S. has approved a 20,000-man increase in the SVN army proposed by Diem.		
8 Apr 61			44. Relays to Saigon U.K. offer to provide intelligence personnel to SVN, to train Vietnamese in Malayan jungle warfare school or send jungle warfare personnel to SVN, and to help SVN handle Montagnard resettlement on basis of experience resettling aborigines in Malaya. State says offer is useful and should be accepted within context of CIP. Suggests CI to work out general lines of integration in CIP.		
12 Apr 61				45. Deputy SecDef memo to the CJCS on Trapnell report (34-35). Supports efforts to get full acceptance of CIP by Diem. Says ISA is now taking up with State the question of direct communication by CHNMAAD through military channels. Also that if JCS determines MAAG increase is needed, will consider at that time.	
13 Apr 61					46. Reports to State on 24 Mar meeting between CI staff group and GVN group (32). Says GVN changes on military actions relatively few and if proposed actions are carried out by GVN, represents considerable progress in arriving at agreed CIP. On political side U.S. proposals sidestepped or opposed. On bringing into government one or two responsible oppositionists, CI group told Diem said only those who accept policy of GVN can serve; and on permitting press and legislative more freedom, told that both are being given more latitude in questioning and criticism; altering or disbanding Can Lao not necessary.
2 May 61					
4 May 61					
15 Apr 61					47. Embassy proposes to State that MAF procurement for extra 20,000 force proceed on long lead-time equipment, warranted by progress in arriving at agreed CIP, but without informing GVN yet in order to maintain pressure on further progress. Reports that 13 April Diem issued decree abolishing MR's, creating 3 corps zones in accord with CIP. Also that greater authority has been delegated to RVNAF general staff, GVN has agreed on a national planning system and is making some progress in implementing, but (a) no decree giving Field Command operational control and no action activating logistics command at corps, (b) Chief of central intelligence not yet appointed, (c) no implementation of basic reorganization and decentralization of government and delegation of authority as announced by Diem in February.
2 May 61			48. JCS sends CINCPAC list of five Presidentially approved actions intended to stiffen SVN resistance.		
4 May 61	49. Senator Fulbright, after conference with JFK, tells press he would not oppose direct U.S. intervention in SVN and Thailand to counter takeover threat (but would oppose in Laos) SVN and Thailand willing to defend themselves.	50. Rusk announces at press conference U.S. will give added military and economic aid to SVN. Says situation cannot be dealt with solely in military terms. Also no reason Laos settlement would produce relaxation in SVN.			
5 May 61	51. Tells press conference U.S. is considering intervention with U.S. forces if necessary to help SVN. One of subjects to be discussed in forthcoming VP visit to SVN, 11 May.				

2-26-63-13

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

<u>DATE</u>	<u>PRESIDENT</u>	<u>STATE</u>	<u>DEFENSE</u>	<u>CINCPAC</u>	<u>COUNTRY TEAM</u>	
9 May 61			52. JCS asks CINCPAC views on plan under study by SecDef to commit U.S. forces to SVN. In order to provide deterrence of further communist aggression from NVN, China, or USSR; to rally morale of SVN; to encourage SEATO and Neutral countries to support SVN. Actions under consideration: a. Send two U.S. battle groups with support units to establish two divisional field training areas; b. Assign PACFLT to coastal patrol using small forces in conjunction with SVN to counter VC infiltration; c. Assign PACAF to border surveillance and close support of SVN ground forces using a small USAF group.			
11 May 61			53. JCS outlines to CINCPAC plan to move U.S. troops into SVN in order to provide visible deterrent to potential NVN or CG action, release SVN forces from static defense positions and engage in CI actions, assist training RVNAF, provide nucleus for any additional major U.S. or SEATO operations in SEA. JCS recommends that troops come from U.S. in order to preserve flexibility of PACOM forces.			
12 May 61				54. Recommends to JCS that if U.S. troops are sent to SVN, forces should consist of a USA infantry division reinforced with Army aviation units, engineers, artillery, and a tailored logistical command. Asks coastal patrol to remain a GVN function with some U.S. assistance from 7th Fleet as normally deployed. Asks for 8 B-57's for border surveillance, close support, and 4 F-102's for possible air defense and counter-air operation and possibly 2-3 reconnaissance aircraft. Suggests designating Chief MAAG as Commander, U.S. Forces Vietnam to exercise operational control of all U.S. forces in SVN, under CINCPAC.	55. After talks with Diem, Johnson tells National Assembly U.S. is ready to support expanded army immediately. (NYHT says U.S. is prepared to increase \$100 million military aid by \$40 million a year. London Times reports Diem told Johnson he has enough manpower in his forces but needs more help in training and equipment.)	
13 May 61					56. Joint Johnson-Diem communique on additional U.S. military and economic aid. (NYT reports agreement to expand MAAG to 1,650.)	
19 May 61					57. Chief MAAG reports that 280,000-man force level and 15 divisions needed to meet internal and external threat. Recommends immediate approval and full support for two more divisions of 15,000 men each.	
20 May 61		58. Sends Saigon complete Presidential program for SVN (48) with instructions to carry out on a priority basis and with a sense of urgency: a. Install radar surveillance system in SVN; b. MAF support and training for 20,000-man force increase; c. Consider need for increase beyond 170,000-man level; d. Extend MAF support for entire CG of 68,000; e. Increase MAAG to extent necessary to carry out program; f. Support SDC; g. Support Junk Force; h. Speed up training of SVN Special Forces; i. Help RVNAF carry out health, welfare, public works programs in villages; j. Study with SVN border control problem; k. Study setting up SEA facility to develop and test new techniques.  Political actions in program intended to increase Diem and GVN confidence in U.S., strengthen support for GVN within SVN, negotiate possible bilateral treaty, improve GVN standing in world opinion.  Economic aspects: team of experts to SVN to work out a financial plan, develop civic action programs with impact-type projects on local level, develop long-range economic program to instill confidence in U.S. actions.				
9 Jun 61				59. In comment on ChMAAG (57) statement of force requirements, doubts that 15 divisions needed, recommends 9 division goal; recommends that ChMAAG develop detailed plans for 30,000 force increase to get under way in 1962 provided GVN demonstrated need and ability to use. Urges that U.S. and GVN first try to organize, train, equip 20,000 man increase, 68,000 CG, 40,000 SDC, and carry out rotation and retraining of existing forces.		
16 Jun 61		60. Announces increase in 689-man MAAG, assignment of specialists to direct training, sending U.S. officers into field to observe RVNAF performance. 150,000-man army to be increased to 170,000; \$40 million more military aid; provision of arms for all as against a part of 60,000-man CG.				
19 Jun 61					61. U.S. financial, economic, military experts headed by Eugene A. Staley arrive in SVN to study methods of countering guerrillas and to establish long term plans to aid SVN economy.	

2-26-63-14

**TOP SECRET**

~~TOP SECRET~~

<u>DATE</u>	<u>PRESIDENT</u>	<u>STATE</u>	<u>DEFENSE</u>	<u>CINCPAC</u>	<u>COUNTRY TEAM</u>
7 Jul 61			b2. JCS asks CINCPAC for summary of principles, planned phases, status of military operational plan of GVN for systematic clearing of VC. Says extent to which GVN has adopted and is implementing operations concepts of 4 Jun Embassy dispatch on CIP is not clear in Washington. Asks extent to which concept of geographical assignment of line units is being universally applied. Also asks CINCPAC evaluation of concepts set forth in Thompson report to GVN 13 April '60 and applicability to SVN.		
8 Jul 61					63. Asks JCS for copy of Thompson report (62).
4 Aug 61			64. JCS recommends to SecDef that RVNAF be increased to 200,000, with periodic assessment during buildup to determine need for additional forces.		
11 Aug 61	65. Authorizes increase of RVNAF to 200,000.				
15 Aug 61					
19 Sep 61			66. JCS advise CINCPAC that in order to guarantee effectiveness of RVNAF before 170,000-man level reached, U.S. wants to be sure that mutually acceptable geographically phased plan for combating the VC exists, that there be U.S.-GVN understanding on training and use of additional 30,000 troops, and that rate of increase can be regulated to permit efficient use of new men.		
19 Sep 61				67. Asks OSD to secure early State approval for introduction of jet aircraft into SVN.	
29 Sep 61				68. Meeting with Dien on occasion of CINCPAC visit, with Ambassador CHMAAG, others. Dien asks for bilateral defense treaty.	
3 Oct 61					69. CHMAAG suggests (to OSD) defoliation project (Operation Ranch Hand); border areas, known VC strongholds, tapoca plants.
5 Oct 61			70. JCS recommends that CINCPAC give priority consideration to placing an element of 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron (CCCS) with MAAG, to train RVNAF and to participate in R&U testing of CI techniques.		71. Ambassador tells State he backs defoliation project (Ranch Hand), provided aircraft carry civilian markings and crews wear civilian clothes (69).
11 Oct 61			72. JCS informs CINCPAC that part of the CCCS would be sent to SVN, and authorizes CINCPAC to coordinate with COMS, USAF.	73. Tells JCS that Oplan 32-59 is a plan to "win" phases 3 and 4 anticipate a war progressing from guerrilla warfare to full-scale war with the communists. Indicates that U.S. could expect sufficient forces from SEA countries to land a SEANU label. Lists forces for phases 3 and 4 and SEATO forces that could be expected. <b>CE</b>	
12 Oct 61			74. JCS asks CINCPAC, in view of possibility that increased aid to SVN might prod communists into open hostilities, to list augmentation he would need to win a war if RVN and CG intervened. (Request made originally by telecon.) (73)		75. CHMAAG asks OSD for six spray-equipped aircraft for Ranch Hand (69).
13 Oct 61					76. Sec. Thuan asks Ambassador for: a. Additional squadron of AD-6 aircraft in lieu of T-28's; b. U.S. civilian pilots for helicopters and C-47's for "noncombat" operations; c. U.S. combat units or "combat-trainer" units to be introduced near 17th parallel and some province capitals in central SVN. d. U.S. reaction to a request for 1 CHINAT division for combat operations in SW SVN.  Thuan confirms that Dien's views against introducing U.S. troops have changed in lieu of worsening security situation.  Ambassador asks for serious and prompt consideration of Thuan's requests.
16 Oct 61					77. Ambassador reports to State that the major factors causing GVN anxiety and requests for a bilateral treaty and U.S. troops are the situation in Laos and the GVN conviction that the approaching solution there is going to transfer communist pressure to SVN. Reports failure to persuade Dien that U.S. policy in Laos is not inconsistent with a U.S. determination to protect SVN. Ambassador suggests there may be no alternative to going all out to reinforce SVN internally, with even faster, more far-reaching, and more expensive measures.

2-26-63-15

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

<u>DATE</u>	<u>PRESIDENT</u>	<u>STATE</u>	<u>DEFENSE</u>	<u>CINCPAC</u>	<u>COUNTRY TEAM</u>	
17 Oct 61			78. JCS asks CINCPAC whether GVN has satisfied agreed conditions for buildup from 170,000 to 200,000: a. Existence of mutually agreed geographically-phased strategic plan against the VC; b. Understanding on the training and employment of extra 30,000 men; c. Regulation of the rate of increase to permit most efficient absorption and utilization of personnel and equipment, with due regard to SVN resources.			
17 Oct 61			79. Seadef proposes that careful review of RVNAF buildup be made early in 1962.			
18 Oct 61					80. In meeting with Gen. Taylor, Diem retreats from Thuan's request for U.S. combat troops at the present time, accepting contingency planning for their introduction. Taylor urges Diem for an overall national plan, offensive spirit and action. 81. Ambassador opposes introducing jet aircraft into SVN because of Geneva Accords.	
18 Oct 61				82. Submits to JCS list of military actions short of introducing U.S. combat forces which can and should be taken at once provided satisfactory diplomatic arrangements can be made with GVN, both to support GVN and to support U.S. forces when and if introduced. a. Deploy two USA helicopter companies to augment airlift; b. Prepare to deploy quickly Jungle Jim squadrons; c. Accelerate delivery of T-28 aircraft for close support; d. Have CIA expand contacts in SVN immediately; e. Continue photo reconnaissance; f. Construct PCL facilities; g. Improve Pleiku airfield; h. Construct Attopeu-Kontum road; i. Preposition in SVN stores of ammunition, communication equipment, other war consumables.		
19 Oct 61					83. "Big" Minh, Commander of SVN Field Command, complains to Taylor that military are not being properly supported by GVN, GVN is losing support of the people, PC's not cooperating.	
19 Oct 61			84. JCS comments to CINCPAC on GVN 13 Oct 61 requests (76): a. Recommends T-28's instead of AD aircraft unless CT is absolutely insistent; b. Approves in principle request for civilian pilots for helicopters and transports for "non-combat" operations, and requests field estimate of requirements; c. Defers comment on introduction of U.S. combat units pending conclusion of Taylor visit; d. Says introduction of CHIMAT's may be considered in the light of overall force requirements, but U.S. reaction at this time is negative.			
21 Oct 61				85. Tells JCS he cannot predict results of defoliation, but is dubious of project to defoliate entire border, since it cannot be patrolled adequately. (09)		
23 Oct 61				86. Urges CHMAAG to obtain a copy of the GVN campaign plan for military action as part of overall CIP. Cites need to see an overall plan setting forth targets, scheme of maneuver, time-phased priorities.		
24 Oct 61					87. In meeting with Diem and Thuan Taylor proposes, as personal ideas for informal reaction: a. Joint U.S.-GVN effort to improve intelligence; b. Joint surveys of security situation at provincial levels; c. Improvement in Army mobility with more helicopters and light aircraft; d. Provision of a U.S. flood relief task force for western provinces, largely military (engineer, medical, signal, transport, with combat troops for their protection); would also provide a U.S. military presence in SVN and would constitute a military reserve in case of heightened military crisis.	

2-26-63-16

~~TOP SECRET~~

<u>DATE</u>	<u>PRESIDENT</u>	<u>STATE</u>	<u>DEFENSE</u>	<u>CINCPAC</u>	<u>COUNTRY TEAM</u>
25 Oct 61					88. ChMAAG tells CINCPAC that RVNAF is convinced it cannot develop a military operations plan setting forth targets, scheme of maneuver, time-phased priorities until it has detailed intelligence on strengths and locations of VC units. RVNAF intends to obtain intelligence by using deep-penetration jungle battalions to locate VC units and bases in remote areas; will then develop specific operations plans for specific targets. Concept takes into account such geographical passing. ChMAAG will continue to press RVNAF for overall plan success (86).
26 Oct 61					89. Ambassador tells State Dins strongly favors defoliation project (Ranch Hand)(69).
28 Oct 61			90. On CCTS deployment, CINCPAC asks that 4 SC-47's, 4 RB-26's, and 8 T-28's be sent without delay (70).		
31 Oct 61					91. Ambassador tells State of virtually unanimous SVN desire for introduction of U.S. forces. Says lack of intervention in Laos has raised question as to whether the U.S. will give armed support to SVN or back down when the chips are down. Wants U.S. forces to demonstrate U.S. will to fight; wants reassuring presence of troops, not thinking in terms of U.S. troops fighting VC.
1 Nov 61				92. Tells JCS he does not think SVN has satisfied JCS conditions but recommends against slowing down the RVNAF buildup on assumption Dins will comply under expected increased pressure after Taylor visit to SVN (78).	
3 Nov 61					93. Ambassador asks State for prompt favorable decision on defoliation project (69).
5 Nov 61					94. CCTS aircraft, personnel, equipment begin to arrive in SVN. All aircraft with RVNAF markings (70).
6 Nov 61					95. ChMAAG urges prompt favorable decision on defoliation project (69).
8 Nov 61			96. JCS informs field that decision on defoliation depends upon the problem of possible communist charges.		
10 Nov 61			97. SecDef directs USAF to furnish 6 C-123 spray-equipped aircraft to CINCPAC on priority basis (69).		
10 Nov 61				98. Directs PACAF to assume operational control of defoliation aircraft for the conduct of operations, assigns planning and coordination responsibility to ChMAAG. Directs ChMAAG to submit plan for time-phased operations (69).	
16 Nov 61				99. Informs ChMAAG that primary mission of CCTS detachment is to conduct tactical training of VNAF (70).	
20 Nov 61			100. JCS directs two USA helicopter companies deployed to western Pacific in anticipation of deployment to SVN.		
20 Nov 61				101. Recommends to JCS intelligence plan for SVN. Provides for: a. Integration of U.S. intelligence specialists into intelligence staffs of RVNAF JCS and ARVN Field Command; b. Assignment of MAAG intelligence advisers to each RVNAF corps, division, and province hq.; c. Augmenting MAAG J-2 intelligence and evaluation center; d. Establishment of a U.S. intelligence/operations radio net.	
27 Nov 61			102. JCS asks CINCPAC views regarding use of CCTS aircraft for combat operations (70).		
28 Nov 61				103. Fully concurs in use of CCTS aircraft for combat operations where such operations are extension of the Jungle Jim (CCTC) mission (70).	
29 Nov 61				104. Gives JCS his views on establishment of unified command in SVN, with proposed organization and terms of reference, to have single spokesman. ChMAAG to retain responsibility for administration and training in connection with MAF (38).	
2 Dec 61					105. ChMAAG submits requirements for additional personnel and aircraft to support the MAAG.

**TOP SECRET**

<u>DATE</u>	<u>PRESIDENT</u>	<u>STATE</u>	<u>DEFENSE</u>	<u>CINCPAC</u>	<u>COUNTRY TEAM</u>
3 Dec 61				106. Asks JCS to seek SecDef approval for the U.S. military to furnish a troposcatter communications network in SVN, in view of lack of urgency in AID section.	
4 Dec 61			107. JCS changes orders on deployment of helicopter companies: two enroute to go directly to SVN and a third ordered deployed. Mission to fly support missions for RVNAF for which SVN pilots not yet qualified, and to help training (100).		
4 Dec 61			108. JCS tells field President o.k.'s defoliation project for December, limited to defoliation of key routes, operations not to proceed until revised and detailed plan approved (69).		
6 Dec 61			109. Directs ChMAAG to submit detailed defoliation plan listing selected areas (69).		
6 Dec 61			110. Asks ChMAAG to consult aboard (70).		
6 Dec 61				111. JCS approves use of C-119 (Jungle Jim) aircraft on combat missions, with combined U.S./SVN crews aboard (70).	
6 Dec 61				112. Sends ChMAAG outline plan prepared by his staff for systematic military campaign against VC, leaving CIP as primary instrument for coordinating U.S. and GVN government-level efforts. Objectives to gain control of critical areas, key facilities, majority of population by military operations, designed to place maximum combat strength of RVNAF into offensive action; and to maintain a posture near the 17th parallel to deter overt aggression (86).	
7 Dec 61			113. SecDef and JCS approve CINCPAC intelligence plan, authorize addition of about 180 intelligence personnel to MAAG (101).		114. ChMAAG again recommends ultimate RVNAF of 275,000 as goal for 1967.
8 Dec 61				115. DA, in response to ChMAAG request for additional personnel and aircraft for MAAG, proposes that units would satisfy the requirements better than individuals and aircraft.	
9 Dec 61			116. JCS asks SecDef approval for CINCPAC proposition that military handle troposcatter network in SVN instead of AID (106).		
10 Dec 61				117. Approves DA proposal for aircraft units rather than ind. aircraft and personnel (105).	
13 Dec 61				118. ChMAAG submits to CINCPAC defoliation plan. Area total 241 square kilometers (69).	
14 Dec 61				119. Ambassador directs that no Jungle Jim combat mission be flown until authorized by him (70).	
15 Dec 61				120. At SecDef conference, ChMAAG asks for 25,000 increment above authorized 200,000-man force level, including 5,000 contingency spaces to meet urgent requirements. Sec Def indicates he would favor an increase beyond 200,000 if it was necessary. CINCPAC suggests that an increase in the CD would be more desirable.	
16 Dec 61				121. CINCPAC returns ChMAAG's defoliation plan as too general; sends his own proposed plan (69).	
20 Dec 61				122. ChMAAG tells CINCPAC Diem showed little enthusiasm when CINCPAC outlines military plan shown to him. Diem reluctant to delegate authority and control of forces to his commanders (86).	
21 Dec 61				123. Recommends that JCS approve the 5,000 contingency spaces requested by ChMAAG, but that consideration of RVNAF force increase beyond 205,000 be deferred pending the evaluation of GVN actions against the VC (120).	
22 Dec 61			124. JCS alerts army aviation for movement to SVN: 1 Army fixed wing co., 1 Hq and Hq detachment of a transport aircraft battalion, 1 Signal detachment (105).		125. ChMAAG tells CINCPAC he needs authority to support Father Hoa's guerrillas (110).
23 Dec 61				126. Asks OASD/ISA for permission to transfer excess MAP items to MAAG.	
26 Dec 61				127. JCS tells CINCPAC that in Jungle Jim aircraft, mixed crews are to be used in combat missions when VNAF lacks capability due to lack of training, such flights to train VNAF personnel to fly combat missions on their own (70).	
19 Jan 62				128. OSD authorizes transfer of excess MAP items to MAAG.	

2-26-63-18

**TOP SECRET**